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Over the last two decades, a large number of countries, both developed and 
developing, have implemented significant capital market reforms, including stock market 
liberalization, improvements in securities clearance and settlements systems, and the 
development of regulatory and supervisory frameworks. These reforms, together with 
improved macroeconomic fundamentals and related reforms, such as the privatization of 
state-owned enterprises and the shift to privately managed defined contribution pension 
systems, were expected to foster domestic financial development.
1 These expectations 
were supported by the growing cross-sectional empirical evidence on the determinants of 
stock market development, which shows that countries with sounder macroeconomic 
policies, better institutional environments, and more efficient legal systems, especially 
regarding the protection of minority investors, have more developed domestic markets.
2 
Capital market reforms were also expected to foster domestic market development 
through their impact on the stock market internationalization process. According to this 
argument, poor domestic environments prompt firms and investors to use international 
markets more intensively. A poor domestic environment has long been considered one of 
the main reasons for capital flight and greater use by domestic residents of financial 
services offered abroad (see, for example, Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo, 2000). Over the 
last decades, there has been an increasing migration of securities market activities to major 
international financial centers, such as New York and London. As part of this 
globalization process, Depositary Receipts (DRs) have become increasingly popular 
instruments.
3 For many developing countries, activity in international markets now 
exceeds domestic stock market activity. A number of papers argue that this 
internationalization process is the result of firms trying to escape from poor domestic 
                                                 
1 This has been deemed an important goal, as financial development is linked to economic growth.  For more 
than a century, economists have emphasized the importance of financial development for growth. 
Historically, the literature focused on the role of banks, beginning with Bagehot (1873) and Schumpeter 
(1912). More recently, Atje and Jovanovic (1993), King and Levine (1993), and Levine and Zervos (1998a), 
among many others, have documented that financial development leads to growth. See Levine (1997) for a 
review of the earlier literature and Levine (2005) for an update. 
2 The literature on domestic stock market development has found that more developed countries tend to have 
deeper stock markets (see, for example, Rajan and Zingales, 2003 and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer, 2006) and that the laws and enforcement mechanisms that protect the rights of minority investors 
foster equity market development (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Macroeconomic stability has also been 
found to promote financial development (IADB, 1995; Boyd, Levine, and Smith, 2001). 
3 There are different alternatives to cross-list domestic stocks in international financial markets. A very 
popular way to do so is through depositary receipts, called American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) or Global 
Depositary Receipts (GDRs). These are foreign currency denominated derivative instruments, issued by 
international banks like Bank of New York or Citibank, representing home securities held with a local 
custodian. Trading in DRs in U.S. exchanges has expanded from 75 billion U.S. dollars in 1990 to one 
trillion in 2005, and there are currently more than 1,900 sponsored ADR programs, issued by firms from 73 
countries.  
2 
environments with weak institutions and poorly functioning markets.
4 This view implies 
that capital market reforms will reduce incentives for firms to internationalize and will 
result in a lower share of equity market activities taking place abroad. This may have 
significant implications for domestic market development, as the migration of trading to 
international financial centers can have negative spillover effects on local markets.
5 
Despite the intense reform efforts, the performance of local capital markets in many 
developing countries has been disappointing. Although some countries experienced 
growth of their stock markets, this growth was not as significant as the one witnessed by 
the most advanced nations. Other countries experienced an actual deterioration of their 
domestic capital markets.
6 Stock markets in many developing countries remain highly 
illiquid and segmented, with trading and capitalization concentrated on few stocks. The 
large number of policy initiatives and reforms and the dismal performance of capital 
markets have raised several questions. Is it possible that capital markets do not respond to 
reforms and that the policy prescriptions were based just on cross-country evidence? Is 
more time needed to see the full fruits of reforms? Does the reform agenda need to be 
rethought?
7 
In this paper we try to shed light on this issue, by analyzing how capital market-
specific and related reforms have impacted both the development of domestic stock 
markets and the internationalization of stock market activities (listing, trading, and capital 
raising). We focus our analysis on six reforms that can potentially contribute to the 
development of stock markets, for which we were able to collect data on implementation 
dates for a large number of countries. These reforms are: stock market liberalization, 
enforcement of insider trading laws, introduction of fully automated electronic trading 
systems, privatization programs, structural pension reform (i.e., shifting from a public 
                                                 
4 Karolyi (2004), for example, argues that the growth of ADR programs in emerging economies is the result 
of poorly functioning stock markets, resulting from economic, political, legal, or other institutional forces 
that generate incentives for firms to leave. This view is also behind the recent literature on “bonding,” which 
argues that cross-listing in an exchange with better investor protection is a form of bonding, creating a 
credible and binding commitment by the issuer to protect the interests of minority shareholders. See Benos 
and Weisbach (2004) for a review of this literature. 
5 Levine and Schmukler (2006a,b) analyze the impact of migration to international markets on domestic 
stock market trading and liquidity. Moel (2001) and Karolyi (2004) also present evidence on how the use of 
ADRs is related to stock market development in emerging economies 
6 See de la Torre and Schmukler (2006) for a description of the evolution of capital markets over the last 
decades, with a focus on Latin America. 
7 From a more general perspective, Easterly (2001) finds that, despite significant policy reforms, developing 
countries have on average stagnated over the last two decades. He argues that worldwide factors may have 
contributed to this stagnation and says that this evidence deals a significant blow to the optimism 
surrounding the “Washington Consensus.” Others have questioned the benefits of specific capital market-
related reforms, such as capital account liberalization (see, for example, Rodrik, 1998 and Stiglitz, 2000).  
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defined benefit pay-as-you-go system to a privately managed funded defined contribution 
system), and institutional reform.
8  
From an academic perspective, the value added of this paper is to analyze the impact 
of different capital market reforms using the same framework and extend the analysis 
beyond domestic stock markets, including activity in international equity markets. There 
are a number of papers that analyze the impact of some of these reforms on certain aspects 
of local stock markets and on macroeconomic variables, such as growth and investment. 
We discuss these papers below, when describing in detail each reform covered by our 
study. However, these papers tend focus only on one reform and usually analyze its 
impact on a specific aspect of domestic stock markets, such as returns or size. We instead 
study the impact of six reforms on domestic markets, using three indicators of stock 
market development: capitalization, trading activity, and capital raising. Furthermore, 
none of these papers include international activity in their analyses. This represents an 
important limitation, given the significant participation of many countries in international 
equity markets. 
From an academic and policy perspective, our study allows policymakers to go 
beyond cross-country evidence and understand the within-country impact of reforms. 
Although the cross-country analysis of the determinants of stock market development is 
very informative, it presents some shortcomings from the standpoint of each country. The 
relevant policy question is how capital market reforms and improvements in the enabling 
environment will affect a country’s stock market. Cross-country evidence might not be 
very helpful in this respect, as some variables are completely exogenous and beyond the 
control of policymakers.
9 And even when the government can manipulate some variables, 
it may be very difficult and might take a very long time for a developing country to 
replicate the environment existent in rich countries, which is the one thought to be optimal 
for finance to flourish. Even panel data analysis may be of limited assistance, as there may 
be little time variation in the macroeconomic and institutional environment and panel 
results might thus be driven by cross-country differences. In this paper, we shift the 
attention away from estimating the cross-sectional relation between fundamentals and 
stock market development, and focus instead on event studies, which show the within-
country changes in stock market development and internationalization around capital 
market reforms.
10 We view this approach as complementary to the panel and cross-country 
analysis documented so far in the literature. 
                                                 
8 Some of these reforms were specifically directed to improving the functioning of domestic stock markets. 
Others, such as privatization, pension reform, and institutional reform, were implemented due to other 
reasons, including reducing public expenditures and improving the business environment, but were part of 
an overall strategy to foster market activity and were expected to support capital market development. 
9 The inclusion of clearly exogenous variables, such as legal origin, religion, or geographical endowments, 
while informative from an analytical perspective, provides no guidance to policymakers about which course 
of action to take. 
10 Wacziarg and Welch (2003) highlight the limitations of cross-country analyses in their study of trade 
liberalization. They find that cross-sectional evidence shows no significant impact of trade openness on  
4 
We find that reforms are associated with increases in domestic stock market 
capitalization, trading, and capital raising, contrary to the claim that they are not effective. 
However, we also find that reforms are associated with increased internationalization, and 
that some of the reforms seem to have been followed by a higher share of activity in 
international markets. This runs contrary to the view that a poor domestic environment 
prompts firms to access international markets and that reforms reduce internationalization.  
Most of the results are robust to controlling for domestic and international 
macroeconomic variables. These controls are important because capital market reforms 
can be contemporaneous to other policy changes (such as macroeconomic stabilization 
programs, trade liberalization, and the easing of exchange rate controls) or may occur at 
high points in the domestic and/or international business cycle. Since many countries 
implemented several capital market reforms in a short period of time, when analyzing 
each reform we also control for other reforms clustered around that time. We find that our 
results remain mostly unchanged when including this control, suggesting that the reforms 
under analysis tend to have a positive marginal effect on domestic stock market 
development and internationalization. We also present some robustness tests controlling 
for time effects in the regressions of domestic stock market development variables and 
find that some of the reform dummies remain statistically significant and positive.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
reforms under analysis. Section 3 presents the empirical results on the impact of reforms 
on domestic stock market development and internationalization. Section 4 discusses some 
potential interpretation problems and presents robustness tests. Section 5 summarizes the 
main results and concludes. 
2. Data 
This section presents the data used in the paper. We first describe the data on stock 
market activity, both in domestic markets and abroad, and then discuss in detail the 
reforms we analyze. 
2.1.  Stock market activity data 
As measures of stock market activity, we use three variables: market capitalization, 
value traded, and amount of equity capital raised. For all, we need data for both domestic 
and international activity. While there are several sources on domestic stock market 
capitalization and value traded that comprise a large number of countries, there is no 
comprehensive database on capital raised domestically. There are even less data available 
                                                                                                                                                   
growth during the 1990s. In contrast to these cross-sectional findings, their within-country evidence shows 
that trade liberalization has a robust positive impact on growth and investment rates.  
5 
on the extent of the internationalization of stock market activities. Therefore, we need to 
combine a number of sources.
11 
On domestic activity, the data on market capitalization and value traded on the 
major local stock exchanges come from the Standard & Poor’s Emerging Markets 
Database and Global Stock Markets Factbook and cover the period 1975-2004 for 117 
countries. The amount of equity capital raised by domestic firms in the local stock market 
comes from the World Federation of Exchanges and covers the period 1982-2004 for 46 
countries. 
On international activity, we use data from Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler 
(2006), who collect firm-level information from several sources and aggregate it to obtain 
country-level variables. Here, we only present a brief description of these data. In terms of 
trading in international markets, the data come from the Bank of New York and cover 
trading in ADRs for the period 1989-2000. Capital raised abroad refers to the sum of the 
amount of new equity financing which is obtained by using a non-domestic instrument 
(such as a foreign listing or an ADR) and any new equity issue abroad. The data come 
from two different sources. One is the Bank of New York and covers capital raised 
through ADRs from 1980 to 2000. The other dataset is compiled by Euromoney and 
covers all capital raising operations in international equity markets by firms for the period 
1983 to 2001. Data from the Bank of New York, Euromoney, the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE), NASDAQ, and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) are also used to identify 
the “international” firms in each country. International firms are those that are listed in 
international markets, directly or via DRs, or have raised capital in international equity 
markets. This classification is used to determine the market capitalization of all 
international firms in each country, which we use as one measure of the level of 
internationalization.
12,13 
We use nine variables for our analysis, three for the development of local stock 
markets, three for the internationalization of stock exchange activities, and three for the 
relative degree of internationalization. The first three are: market capitalization over gross 
domestic product (GDP), value traded domestically over GDP, and capital raised 
                                                 
11 The list of countries and data sources for both the dependent and independent variables used in our 
regressions are detailed in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. 
12 This measure does not indicate whether the shares of these firms are actively traded in international 
markets. For some cross-listed stocks, trading is largely in the home market rather than abroad. Also, some 
stocks might have little free float available for (foreign) investors. Both facts may lead to an overestimation 
of the degree of internationalization when using this variable. The other measures of level of 
internationalization, trading and capital raised abroad, do not suffer from these potential biases, since they 
quantify the actual activity that takes place in international markets. The results using the market 
capitalization of international firms are similar to those using the variables that capture actual activity 
abroad, and thus do not alter our conclusions. 
13 For all the internationalization variables (market capitalization of international firms, value traded abroad, 
and capital raised abroad), observations are assigned a zero when no activity in international equity markets 
is identified.  
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domestically over GDP. The next three are: market capitalization of international firms 
over GDP, value traded abroad over GDP, and capital raised abroad over GDP. The last 
three are: market capitalization of international firms over total domestic market 
capitalization, value traded abroad over value traded domestically, and capital raised 
abroad over capital raised domestically.
14 
2.2.  Capital market reforms 
As mentioned above, we analyze the impact of six capital market-specific and 
related reforms: stock market liberalization, enforcement of insider trading laws, 
introduction of fully automated electronic trading systems, privatization programs, 
structural pension reform, and institutional reform.
15 While these reforms were a 
significant part of the capital market reform programs implemented by most countries, this 
list is not exhaustive and does not attempt to cover all the policy initiatives oriented 
towards fostering stock market development that were implemented over the last decades. 
The focus on these reforms is driven by their relevance, as many imply significant policy 
changes, and by data availability on their implementation dates for a large enough number 
of countries. Although we believe that we cover some of the most significant capital 
market related reforms, some policies not included in our analysis due to lack of data may 
be as relevant, if not more, for stock market development. We now turn to the description 
of each reform and the data sources. 
Stock market liberalization is the decision by a government to allow foreign 
investors to purchase shares in the local stock market and domestic investors to purchase 
shares abroad. International asset pricing models predict that the integration with world 
financial markets should lead to a reduction in the cost of capital.
16 A number of papers 
assess the impact of stock market liberalization on the cost of equity capital, finding 
evidence of an increase in share prices around the liberalization date and a reduction in the 
cost of capital afterwards.
17 Other papers analyze the impact of stock market liberalization 
on real variables, reporting significant increases in investment and economic growth 
following liberalization.
18 Regarding stock market development, liberalization increases 
the pool of capital available to local firms and broadens the investor base. This is likely to 
lead to increased liquidity and larger amounts of research, improving the quantity and 
quality of information available to market participants. Furthermore, the scrutiny of 
foreign investors and analysts may increase transparency and promote the adoption of 
                                                 
14 Note that for the domestic activity measures we have data up to 2004, while our data on 
internationalization end in 2000. As a robustness check, we also estimated all the regressions using domestic 
variables up to 2000 only and found similar results. 
15 Appendix Table 1 lists the dates of the different reforms analyzed.  
16 See, for example, Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977), Stulz (1981, 1999), Errunza and Losq (1985), 
Eun and Janakiramanan (1986), and Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan (1987). 
17 See, for example, Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Henry (2000a, 2003), Kim and Singal (2000), and Edison 
and Warnock (2003a). 
18 See, for example, Henry (2000b, 2003) and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005).  
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better corporate governance practices, reducing agency problems (Stulz, 1999; Errunza, 
2001). Therefore, liberalization was expected to result in deeper and more efficient stock 
markets. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001) find that liberalization had a positive 
impact on domestic trading and listing. Jain-Chandra (2002) also finds significant 
increases in trading activity and reports improvements in market efficiency following 
liberalization. Bae, Bailey, and Mao (2006) find that stock market liberalization improves 
the information environment in emerging markets.
19 
Our data for dating the liberalization of stock markets come from three sources: 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005), who present official liberalization dates, mostly 
for developing countries; Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), who construct an index of the 
extent of stock market liberalization which also includes developed economies; and 
Vinhas de Souza (2005), who extends this index to Eastern European countries.
20 We 
combine these three sources to get the widest possible coverage.
21  
As part of the capital market reform programs, governments approved new laws and 
regulations aimed at creating the proper legal and regulatory framework for capital 
markets to flourish. Many countries tried to improve corporate governance practices, by 
introducing new standards in a number of different areas, including voting ratings, tender 
procedures, and the structure of the board of directors. Some countries also enacted new 
insider trading regulations and improved accounting and disclosure standards. As we 
mentioned above, the recent literature has emphasized the role of the protection of 
minority investors for the development of stock markets. Most of the cross-country data 
available for this variable is time invariant, and therefore cannot be used to analyze the 
impact of reforms. To account for improvements in the legal framework for investors, we 
thus focus on the enforcement of insider trading regulations. The date of insider trading 
laws enforcement is the date of the first prosecution under these laws. These data come 
from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), who carry out a comprehensive survey of insider 
trading laws, finding that these laws existed in 87 countries by 1998 but had been 
enforced, as evidenced by prosecutions, in only 38 of them. They also find that the cost of 
equity does not change after the introduction of insider trading regulations, but decreases 
considerably after the first prosecution. 
Policymakers also took important strides towards establishing and improving the 
basic environment for capital market operations, including new policies related to 
                                                 
19 Levine and Zervos (1998b) analyze the impact of capital account liberalization on stock market 
development in 16 developing countries and find evidence of significant increases in market capitalization 
and trading in most countries. 
20 For the data from Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) and Vinhas de Souza (2005), we consider the first year 
when a country’s stock market is fully liberalized as the liberalization date. Alternatively, we also used the 
date of the first partial liberalization and obtained similar results. 
21 Alternatively, we also ran regressions using only the Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) dates and 
their “First Sign” liberalization measure, which is based on the earliest of three possibilities: the launching 
of a country fund, an ADR announcement, and the official liberalization date. We obtained similar results 
using these variables.  
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centralized exchanges, securities clearance and settlement systems, trading platforms, and 
custody arrangements. These reforms were expected to improve market performance, by 
increasing liquidity, enhancing efficiency, and reducing trading costs. We focus our 
analysis on the replacement of traditional trading floors, on which brokers manually match 
orders using an open outcry system, by fully automated electronic trading systems. 
Electronic trading systems may increase liquidity and improve efficiency by reducing 
transaction costs and increasing information availability. These trading systems may also 
attract new pools of liquidity, by providing affordable remote access to investors.
22 The 
dates of the introduction of electronic trading systems come from Jain (2005), who 
collects data on stock exchanges in 120 countries and finds that the leading exchanges in 
101 of those countries have introduced electronic trading over the last 25 years.
23 He finds 
evidence that the introduction of electronic trading systems enhances liquidity and leads to 
a reduction in the cost of capital. 
In the last twenty years, governments from all over the world have undertaken 
significant privatization programs. Worldwide revenues from privatization soared during 
the 1990s, peaking in 1998 at over 100 billion U.S. dollars (OECD, 2001). This 
privatization process was motivated by the desire to increase government revenues, 
promote economic efficiency, and reduce government interference in the economy (see 
Megginson and Netter, 2001 for a review of the empirical literature on privatization). 
Domestic capital market development was also an explicit objective of privatization 
programs in many countries. Privatizations had a direct impact on domestic stock markets, 
as many governments carried out privatization sales through share offerings on local 
exchanges. Due to the positive externalities generated by listing decisions, these share 
issues were expected to foster stock market development, by increasing the diversification 
opportunities available to investors and therefore encouraging trading activity and new 
listings by private firms (Pagano, 1989, 1993). Share issue privatizations (SIPs) could also 
increase the participation of uninformed retail investors in local stock exchanges, reducing 
adverse selection in the market and increasing liquidity (Kyle, 1985).
24 Perotti and van 
Oijen (2001) argue that privatization programs, even without share offerings on local 
exchanges, may foster stock market development by reducing political risk and signaling 
commitment to market-oriented policies. Privatizations also had a direct impact on 
                                                 
22 See Domowitz and Steil (1999) for a discussion of the impact of electronic trading on the exchange 
industry. Blennerhasset and Bowman (1998) report a fall in transaction costs after the move to electronic 
trading in the New Zealand Stock Exchange. Green et al. (2003) also find improvements in efficiency and 
liquidity following the introduction of screen-based trading in the Mumbai Stock Exchange. 
23 We consider the introduction of a fully automated system as the relevant change. Jain (2005) finds that in 
11 of the exchanges covered in his paper floor trading coexists with electronic trading. We exclude these 
exchanges from the analysis. 
24 See Chiesa and Nicodano (2003) for a review of the theoretical arguments on the impact of privatization 
on stock market development. Bortolotti et al. (2004) analyze the impact of SIPs in 19 developed countries 
and find that they are associated with improvements in turnover and liquidity.  
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internationalization, as many privatization sales involved offerings in international 
financial markets.
25 
To date the start of privatization programs we use data from the World Bank 
privatization database, which records privatization transactions from developing countries 
between 1988 and 2003, and the Privatization Barometer database, which has data on 
privatization transactions starting in 1977 for 23 European countries. For some countries 
not included in these databases, we collected data on privatization transactions from 
government sources. We define the starting date of a privatization process as the first year 
with at least two privatization transactions that is followed by further transactions in at 
least three of the next four years.
26 We require privatization activity to be maintained for 
at least some time because we want to capture the start of a privatization program and not 
isolated transactions. Also, note that we focus on transactions and not the announcement 
of a privatization program or the introduction of a privatization law, as we want to capture 
the actual implementation of a privatization program. 
Another significant reform in many countries, especially in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe, was the shift from public pay-as-you-go pension systems to privately 
managed funded systems.
27 Chile was the first country to implement this type of reform in 
1981 and several countries adopted similar systems during the 1990s. Structural pension 
reforms were expected to improve macroeconomic stability, by reducing the demographic 
pressures of pay-as-you-go systems and inducing fiscal reform during the transition, 
reduce labor market distortions, increase savings, and reduce political interference in the 
system.
28 Pension reform was also seen as conductive for capital market development. As 
reviewed by Walker and Lefort (2002), pension reform may foster the development of 
domestic capital markets through three main channels: by inducing authorities to improve 
the regulatory framework (accumulating “institutional capital”), increasing specialization 
in the investment decision-making process, and improving incentives for financial 
innovation.
29 
                                                 
25 See Bortolotti, Fantini, and Scarpa (2002) for an analysis of the determinants of privatizations through 
share offerings in international markets. 
26 For countries that record privatization transactions in 1988 or 1989 in the World Bank privatization 
database, we use the dates from Perotti and van Oijen (2001). 
27 The nature of the reforms differed across countries, with some countries shifting to fully funded systems 
of privately managed individual accounts, while others created multipillar systems, in which part of the 
pension system is pay-as-you-go and there is also a distinct and separate privately managed funded 
component. See Rutkowski (1998, 2002) for a description of the reforms in transition economies. Queisser 
(1998), De Ferranti, Leipziger, and Srinivas (2002) and Gill, Packard, and Yermo (2005), among many 
others, review the Latin American experience. 
28 There is a large literature discussing the impact of structural pension reforms. See, for example, World 
Bank (1994), Feldstein (1998), Orszag and Stiglitz (2001), and Feldstein and Liebman (2002). 
29 Walker and Lefort (2002) find evidence of a reduction in the cost of capital and higher trading volumes as 
a result of pension reform. Catalan, Impavido, and Musalem (2001) analyze the Granger causality between 
contractual savings (assets held by pension funds and life insurance companies) and stock market  
10 
To date the implementation of pension reforms we combine data from several 
sources, including Palacios and Pallares-Millares (2000), the International Association of 
Pension Funds Supervisory Authorities (AIOS), the International Federation of Pension 
Funds Administrators (FIAP), and the International Center for Pension Reform.
30 
As discussed above, cross-country evidence on the determinants of stock market 
development shows that countries with better institutional frameworks tend to have more 
active stock markets. However, for many developing countries it may be very difficult, if 
not impossible, to replicate the institutional environment existing in developed countries. 
Therefore, we focus our analysis on the impact of institutional changes on stock market 
development and internationalization, not on the absolute quality of institutions. To date 
institutional improvements we use data from IMF (2005), which analyzes changes in 
economic institutions for approximately 90 developing countries over the 1970-2004 
period. Dates of institutional transitions are based on the evolution of the Cato Institute 
index of economic freedom, which measures a country’s business environment by 
analyzing five major areas: government size, legal structure and security of property 
rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and regulation of credit, 
labor, and business (see Gwartney and Lawson, 2004 for a detailed description).
31 IMF 
(2005) identifies 65 episodes of sustained transition towards higher economic freedom. 
3.  Reforms and stock market development and internationalization 
In this section, we analyze the impact of reforms on domestic stock market 
development and internationalization using event studies. Since we are interested in the 
within-country effects of reforms (abstracting from cross-country variations), we estimate 
fixed-effects regressions of our nine measures of domestic stock market development and 
internationalization on a dummy for each reform, defined by the reform dates described 
above.
32 We concentrate our analysis on a ten-year window around the reform dates (five 
years before and five years after, including the reform year) and include only those 
                                                                                                                                                   
development and find evidence that the growth in contractual savings causes increases in market 
capitalization and trading. 
30 Pension reforms in Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland involved adding a tier to an 
existing system or converting a voluntary funded scheme into a mandatory one. In contrast, the reforms in 
the remaining countries represented major changes, shifting from publicly managed unfunded schemes to 
multipillar systems or to completely privately managed funded schemes. Given the difference in the nature 
of the reforms, we also estimated our regressions excluding Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland and obtained similar results. 
31 The index of economic freedom ranges from one (repressed) to ten (free). IMF (2005) defines the start of 
an institutional transition in a country as the first year in which the forward looking eight-year moving 
average of this index exceeds by at least one point its backward looking eight-year moving average and 
reaches a minimum level of four points. The list of transitions was reviewed by IMF country desks and 
adjusted where appropriate. 
32 The reform dummy equals one on and after the date of reform, and zero before.  
11 
countries with at least two annual observations before and after the implementation of the 
reforms.
33 
Regression results for the domestic development variables, the foreign activity 
variables, and the ratio of international to domestic activity are presented in Tables 1, 2, 
and 3, respectively. Each column reports the results for a specific reform. Note that the 
sample of countries and the period covered varies across columns, as only those countries 
that implemented the reform under analysis are included in each regression and the period 
analyzed changes according to the reform date for each country. 
The estimations on market capitalization over GDP (Table 1, top panel) show that 
all the reform coefficients are positive and significant at the one percent level. 
Furthermore, the size of these coefficients is quite large. In the case of stock market 
liberalization, for example, the pre-reform average stock market capitalization over GDP 
is 19.3 percent and the within-country difference between the pre-liberalization and post-
liberalization periods is 14.2 percentage points.  
Similar results are found for value traded domestically (middle panel) and capital 
raised domestically (bottom panel). All the reforms, with the exception of stock market 
liberalization, seem to be followed by increased trading activity in the local market. In the 
case of capital raised, only pension reform is not significant. 
Reforms also seem to be associated with increases in stock market 
internationalization. All the reforms under analysis are followed by significant increases in 
the market capitalization of international firms over GDP (Table 2, top panel). Trading 
abroad (middle panel) and capital raised abroad (bottom panel) also increase after the 
implementation of reforms. Pension reform is significant only at the ten percent level for 
trading abroad and is not statistically significant in the case of capital raised in 
international markets. 
These results show that reforms are followed by increased domestic stock market 
development and internationalization. This suggests that reforms may make local firms 
more attractive to foreign investors, who then grant them access to international markets at 
attractive terms. This evidence is consistent with the findings of Claessens, Klingebiel, 
and Schmukler (2006), who report that better fundamentals foster stock market 
development, but also increase internationalization. Some of the results may also reflect 
                                                 
33 By focusing on a ten-year window around the reforms we may not be capturing their whole impact if they 
take more than five years to mature. However, while in traditional event studies the econometrician can be 
certain that the event under analysis is isolated, capital market reforms often coincide with other 
macroeconomic and institutional reforms. By focusing on a shorter event window we attempt to isolate from 
other changes that may also affect stock market development and internationalization. We discuss this issue 
in more detail in Section 4. We also tried the regressions without restricting the sample period to a preset 
window (i.e., including all available observations) and using a shorter six-year window, and obtained similar 
results in both cases. We also estimated the regressions including only countries with at least three years of 
data available before and after the reforms and obtained similar results. However, for some reforms and 
dependent variables this reduces significantly the number of countries.  
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the direct impact of reforms. In the case of privatization, for example, as we mention 
above, some firms were privatized through public offerings in international markets. This 
should have a direct effect on the three internationalization variables analyzed. 
A relevant question is whether the reforms are followed by similar increases in 
domestic and international activity. The evidence presented so far does not allow us to 
answer this question because the samples used for the regressions on domestic and 
international variables (relative to GDP) are different, due to data availability. Therefore, 
we analyze the impact of reforms on the ratio of international to domestic activity, which 
constraints the sample to be the same. These results are presented in Table 3. 
The results for the ratio of the market capitalization of international firms to total 
domestic market capitalization (Table 3, top panel), suggest that reforms are followed by 
an acceleration in the internationalization process. All the reform coefficients are positive 
and significant at the one percent level. Furthermore, the size of the coefficients is quite 
large. The regressions on value traded abroad over value traded domestically (middle 
panel) present similar results. All the reforms, with the exception of privatization and the 
introduction of electronic trading systems, seem to be followed by large increases in the 
share of trading that takes place in international markets.
34 
Finally, for the ratio of capital raised abroad to capital raised domestically (bottom 
panel), the results show that stock market liberalization, privatization, and institutional 
reform are associated with a larger share of activity in international markets. The rest of 
the reforms are not statistically significant. This may reflect the fact that this ratio is quite 
lumpy and fluctuates widely from year to year, depending on individual equity issues. 
Alternatively, the lack of significance of the reform dummies may just indicate that the 
reforms are followed by similar changes in domestic and international capital raising, 
leaving the ratio unchanged. 
In sum, our results show that capital market reforms are followed by significant 
increases in domestic stock market activity and internationalization. Furthermore, they 
seem to be associated with a larger share of activity in international markets. Although our 
regressions show a statistically significant correlation between reforms and stock market 
activity, both domestically and abroad, there are a number of arguments that suggest that 
these results should be interpreted with care and that it is difficult to show a causal link 
between reforms and market activity. We now turn to those arguments and present some 
robustness tests. 
                                                 
34 In the case of privatization, the results are driven by two countries (the Netherlands and South Africa) that 
experienced very large increases in domestic trading after the reform, which translated into a lower ratio of 
value trade abroad to value traded domestically. If we exclude these two countries, the coefficient on 
privatization is positive and significant at the one percent level.  
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4.  Robustness tests and alternative explanations 
A possible explanation for the positive relation we find between reforms and stock 
market activity is that it is driven by some omitted variables that are correlated with 
reforms, but not by the reforms themselves. For instance, countries may time their reforms 
to coincide with high points in the world business cycle. That is, there might be common 
factors.
35 In this case, our results may overstate the impact of reforms, since the reform 
dummies may be capturing the effect of the international business cycle on stock market 
activity. This may be particularly relevant for some reforms, such as stock market 
liberalization and privatization, as governments have incentives to liberalize and privatize 
when they face favorable international conditions and therefore expect valuations to be 
higher. 
As another example of omitted factors, capital market reforms are often part of 
larger macroeconomic and institutional reform programs. Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez 
(1993) and Henry (2000b) discuss how policy reforms in developing countries often 
involve macroeconomic reforms, including trade liberalization, macroeconomic 
stabilization programs, and the easing of exchange rate controls. These policies may have 
a significant impact on growth prospects and might lead to increased stock market 
activity, both domestically and abroad. Our reform dummies may thus be capturing the 
impact of the contemporaneous macroeconomic and institutional changes, and not that of 
the capital market reform analyzed in each case. 
To address these concerns, we reestimate the regressions from Tables 1, 2, and 3 
controlling for additional variables. In particular, we include U.S. interest rates and GDP 
growth in high-income OECD countries to control for the world business cycle.
36 To 
capture the impact of contemporaneous macroeconomic reforms, we do not use reform 
dummies, as we do not have sufficient information to date these reforms for all the 
countries in our dataset. Therefore, we follow an indirect approach, by controlling for 
domestic fundamentals that may capture the outcome of these reforms. Specifically, we 
control for GDP growth and the fiscal deficit.
37 Note that GDP growth may also be 
                                                 
35 The international finance literature has highlighted to the role of global factors, such as interest rates and 
growth, in explaining capital flows to emerging markets (see, for example, Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart, 
1993; Fernandez-Arias, 1996; and Edison and Warnock, 2003b). Albuquerque, Loayza, and Servén (2005) 
find that these common factors are increasingly important in the case of foreign direct investment. 
36 We also estimated the regressions using, alternatively, U.S., world, and G-7 GDP growth and obtained 
similar results. As a measure of U.S. interest rates, we use the rate on three-year Treasury bonds. We also 
ran the regressions using the rates on five-year Treasury bonds and three-month Treasury bills, the federal 
funds rate, and the S&P 500 annual return. The results using these variables are similar to the ones reported 
below. We also included the change in the terms of trade in each country as an independent variable, to 
control for external shocks, and obtained similar results. 
37 We also estimated the regressions using other proxies for reforms, such as inflation, trade (exports plus 
imports) as a percentage of GDP, and the International Country Risk Guide composite index, which 
measures political, economic, and financial conditions in a country. Including these variables does not affect 
our main results. We also controlled for each country’s growth prospects, as measured by the growth 
opportunities index developed by Bekaert et al. (2006), and obtained results similar to those reported here.  
14 
interpreted as a measure of the domestic business cycle, which may also affect the timing 
of capital market reforms.  
Tables 4, 5, and 6 present the results of the regressions on domestic stock market 
development, internationalization, and the ratio of international to domestic activity, 
respectively. For each reform, we present two specifications: the first one only includes 
the reform dummies and domestic macroeconomic variables, while the second one also 
controls for those variables that proxy for the world business cycle.
38 
The regressions on stock market capitalization over GDP (Table 4, top panel) show 
that our results are robust to controlling for macroeconomic variables and the international 
business cycle. All the reform coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 
one percent level. Most of the coefficients are lower than those reported in Table 1, which 
suggests that in those regressions our reform dummies may be capturing part of the 
positive impact of macroeconomic reforms and the international business cycle on 
domestic market capitalization. Regarding the remaining variables, the coefficients on 
fiscal deficit over GDP are negative and statistically significant while those on GDP 
growth tend to be positive and significant. We also find that the international business 
cycle affects domestic stock markets, with higher U.S. interest rates and lower OECD 
growth resulting in lower market capitalizations. 
The results for value traded domestically (middle panel) are similar, with all reform 
coefficients being positive and significant, except for those on stock market liberalization, 
consistent with the results reported in Table 1. In the case of capital raised domestically 
over GDP (bottom panel), all the reforms are statistically significant, with the exception of 
pension reform, in line with the results in Table 1. 
The results in Table 5 show that reforms tend to be followed by increased 
capitalization, trading, and capital raising in international markets, even when controlling 
for macroeconomic variables and the international business cycle. In the case of the 
market capitalization of international firms over GDP (top panel), all the reform 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant. The results for value traded abroad 
(middle panel) are similar. Only the introduction of electronic trading systems and pension 
reform are not statistically significant in the specifications that include all the control 
variables. The results for capital raised abroad (bottom panel) are consistent with those 
reported in Table 2, with all reforms being followed by significant increases in capital 
raising in international equity markets, except for pension reform. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Furthermore, we controlled for GDP per capita since general economic and institutional development may 
affect the evolution of stock markets and the effect of reforms. The results remain mostly unchanged. 
38 The fiscal deficit over GDP variable is not available for all countries and periods; therefore in these 
regressions we have a smaller number of observations than in Tables 1, 2, and 3. We also estimated the 
regressions controlling only for GDP growth, which allows us to use all the available observations, and 
obtained similar results.  
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Finally, the results reported in Table 6 show that reforms tend to be followed by an 
increased share of market capitalization and trading in international markets. In the case of 
the market capitalization of international firms over total domestic market capitalization 
(top panel), all the reform dummies are positive and statistically significant at the one 
percent level, except for institutional reform when controlling for the international 
business cycle. For the ratio of value traded abroad to value traded domestically (middle 
panel), all the reform coefficients are positive and statistically significant, with the 
exception of those on the introduction of electronic trading systems and privatization. 
However, when controlling for international growth and interest rates the enforcement of 
insider trading laws and institutional reform lose their significance. For capital raised 
abroad over capital raised domestically, the coefficients on stock market liberalization, the 
introduction of electronic trading systems, privatization, and institutional reform are 
positive and significant when controlling only for domestic variables, but tend to lose their 
significance when we also include the variables that proxy for the international business 
cycle. The remaining reform coefficients are not significant. These results may be due to 
the lumpy nature of this ratio and to the fact that firms may raise relatively more equity in 
international markets when conditions in those markets are better. In this case, the 
international business cycle indicators may be capturing most of the time variation of this 
variable. Alternatively, the results may just mean that reforms are followed by similar 
increases in capital raised domestically and abroad. 
The evidence presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6 shows that the positive correlation 
between capital market reforms and stock market development and internationalization is 
robust to a number of potential omitted variables, but should still be interpreted with 
caution. Although in these regressions we attempt to control for a number of 
contemporaneous macroeconomic and institutional reforms, we may not be capturing all 
the reforms and their complete impact. Some of these reforms may be pre-requisites for 
successful capital market reforms. We may also be omitting other relevant variables that 
drive the processes of domestic stock market development and internationalization. To the 
extent that our reform dummies inadvertently capture the effect of these variables, we may 
be overstating the impact of reforms. 
All the analyses presented above have focused on measuring the impact of each 
reform, without taking into account other capital market reforms. However, countries tend 
to implement several capital market reforms in a relatively short period of time. In fact, 
our data show that 26 countries in our sample (about 40 percent of those with data 
available on all of the six reforms under analysis) have implemented at least three capital 
market reforms in a five-year period. Thus, the reform dummies in our regressions may 
not be capturing the marginal effect of each reform, but rather the impact of other capital 
market reforms implemented around the same date. Also, the literature suggests that the 
different capital market reforms may be closely interrelated. For instance, Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) argue that openness to capital flows may reduce the power of incumbents 
who oppose reforms that foster financial development. Similarly, Walker and Lefort 
(2002) argue that pension reform may prompt improvements in securities market 
regulations. This suggests that capital market reforms may not be independent of each  
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other. Although we try to measure the impact of each reform separately, what may matter 
most for stock market development is a comprehensive set of reforms and not the 
implementation of isolated reforms. 
To measure the marginal effect of each reform, we reestimate our regressions 
controlling for the number of capital market reforms implemented by each country, other 
than the reform under analysis in each case.
39,40 This variable captures the impact of 
additional capital market reforms clustered around the reform being analyzed (i.e., reforms 
implemented more than five years before or after the reform under study do not affect our 
results). Given that we control for country-level fixed effects, our results are not affected 
by differences across countries in the number of reforms implemented. To keep the 
number of tables at a manageable level, we only report the results without including 
additional control variables and excluding the capital raising measures given their lumpy 
nature.
41 The results are presented in Table 7. 
The top panel in Table 7 shows the regressions for the domestic stock market 
development variables. Most of our results are robust to controlling for the 
implementation of additional capital market reforms. All the reforms, except for the 
enforcement of insider trading laws, are followed by significant increases in market 
capitalization over GDP. Similar results are found for value traded domestically over 
GDP. All the reforms, with the exception of stock market liberalization and institutional 
reform, are followed by increased trading activity in the local market. Most of the 
coefficients are lower than those reported in Table 1, which suggests that in those 
regressions our reform dummies may be capturing part of the effect of other capital 
market reforms clustered around that time. The results also show that the number of 
additional reforms tends to be positive and statistically significant. 
Reforms also seem to be associated with increases in stock market 
internationalization, even when controlling for other capital market reforms (middle 
panel). All the reforms under analysis are followed by significant increases in the market 
capitalization of international firms over GDP. Trading abroad also increases after the 
                                                 
39 This variable is calculated by adding up the different reform dummies, other than that for the reform under 
analysis in each case. This requires having information to determine whether countries implemented all of 
the six reforms analyzed in this paper or not. Therefore, the sample of countries included in these 
regressions is restricted to countries with data available on all capital market reforms. As an alternative, we 
estimated the regressions assuming that those countries with missing data on a reform did not implement it 
and obtained similar results. 
40 We use the number of additional reforms to control for contemporaneous reforms and not one dummy for 
each reform because the different reform dummies tend to be highly correlated. As an alternative, we also 
estimated the regressions including only those countries that implemented specific reforms in relative 
isolation from other capital market reforms. If our reform dummies are only capturing the effect of 
implementing a comprehensive capital market reform package, and not the impact of individual reforms, one 
would expect those countries that implemented isolated reforms to experience no significant change in stock 
market activity. However, our results indicate that even in those countries, most reforms are followed by 
significant increases in stock market activity both at home and abroad. 
41 In most cases, similar results are obtained when controlling for domestic macroeconomic variables.  
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implementation of reforms, only the introduction of electronic trading systems and 
pension reform are not statistically significant. The results also show that the number of 
additional reforms tends to be positive and significant. 
Finally, the results for the share of international activity (bottom panel) suggest that 
reforms are followed by an acceleration in the internationalization process. In the 
regressions of the ratio of the market capitalization of international firms to total domestic 
market capitalization, all the reform coefficients enter positively and significantly, except 
for that on institutional reform. The results also indicate that the enforcement of insider 
trading laws and pension reform are followed by significant increases in value traded 
abroad over value traded domestically. 
In sum, the results reported in Table 7 suggest that the reform dummies in our 
regressions are not just capturing the effect of implementing a capital market reform 
package (i.e., several reforms in a short period of time), but rather that the reforms 
analyzed have a positive marginal impact on stock market development and 
internationalization. It would be interesting to explore whether certain reforms tend to 
complement each other and if differences in the timing of specific reforms affect their 
impact on stock market development and internationalization, but this exceeds the 
objectives of this paper. 
A difficult question concerning our results is whether the reform dummies are 
estimating the effect of some underlying trend not captured by the controls already 
included in the regressions. To the extent that there are some remaining omitted factors 
that drive the processes of stock market development and internationalization over time, 
the reform variables could be capturing the impact of those omitted factors. Most of the 
reforms took place in the first half of the 1990s and the post-reform period coincides with 
strong global trends towards financial development and internationalization, posing a 
challenge to the accurate identification of the marginal effect of reforms. With the 
available data, there is no easy answer to this question. 
To try to address this issue, we reestimated our regressions controlling for time 
effects to capture any omitted factors that vary with time. But given the short time series 
available for the post-reform period and the presence of strong trends, including time 
effects in our regressions is likely to weaken the impact and significance of the reform 
dummies, even if reforms had a positive effect on stock market activity. Therefore, these 
results could be interpreted as a lower bound measure of the effect of reforms. Conversely, 
the results without controlling for time effects could be interpreted as an upper bound 
measure of the impact of reforms, as they assign the impact of any underlying trend to the 
reforms.  
Several issues emerge when including a trend. An important question that arises is 
whether these time effects are similar across countries and regions. The data suggest that 
the evolution of stock markets over the last decades has differed among developed and 
developing countries, therefore we include a common time trend across all countries and  
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the interaction between this time trend and a dummy variable that equals one for 
developing countries and zero for developed ones. Moreover, to be able to accurately 
estimate these time trends and differentiate them from the effect of reforms, we include all 
the years for which we have data available on the dependent variables in these regressions 
(we do not restrict the sample to a ten-year window around the reform dates). We also 
include all countries with data on the dependent variables, irrespective of whether they 
implemented the reform under analysis, to obtain better estimates of the time effects.
42 We 
present results only for the domestic stock market development variables, as we have a 
significantly shorter time series for internationalization variables, which makes it very 
difficult to separate the effect of a time trend from that of the reforms. To keep the number 
of tables at a manageable level, we only present the results without including additional 
controls.
43 The results are presented in Table 8. 
The results for stock market capitalization over GDP (top panel) show that, even 
when controlling for time effects, some of the reforms remain statistically significant. In 
particular, the enforcement of insider trading laws, privatization, and pension reform are 
followed by significant increases in market capitalization. Regarding the time effects, the 
results show that there is a positive and significant trend, but this trend is lower (although 
still positive) in the case of developing countries.
44 
The results for both value traded domestically (middle panel) and capital raised 
domestically (bottom panel) also show that some capital market reforms are followed by 
significant increases in domestic activity, even when controlling for time effects. In 
particular, the enforcement of insider trading laws, the introduction of electronic trading 
systems, and institutional reform are all statistically significant and positive in the 
regressions of value traded domestically over GDP. In the case of capital raised 
domestically, the introduction of electronic trading systems and privatization are both 
significant at the one percent level. 
In sum, even with the difficulty of separating the two effects mentioned above, the 
finding that some reforms remain positive and significant in Table 8 suggests that our 
reform dummies are not just capturing the effects of some underlying trend, but rather that 
these reforms were associated with the development of domestic stock markets. In the 
case of internationalization, separating the impact of a common time trend from that of 
reforms would require longer time series of our dependent variables.  
                                                 
42 The sample in these regressions is restricted to those countries for which we have information to 
determine whether they implemented the reform under analysis in each case or not. As an alternative, we 
estimated the regressions assuming that those countries with missing data on a reform did not implement it 
and obtained similar results in most cases. 
43 In most cases, similar results can be obtained when controlling for domestic and international 
macroeconomic variables. 
44 The time trend for developing countries is equal to the sum of both the common time trend and the trend 
interacted with the developing country dummy. This time effect is positive and statistically different from 
zero at the one percent level in all specifications.  
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Finally, an important question is whether the reform decision is really exogenous or 
if countries implement reforms when they expect their stock markets to do well. If this 
were the case, causality would run in the opposite direction. We believe that endogeneity 
could potentially be relevant for some of the reforms analyzed, but in any case does not 
affect our results on internationalization. In other words, endogeneity arguments usually 
refer to domestic stock market development, as countries may implement reforms when 
they anticipate increased local market activity. It is less likely that reforms are 
implemented in response to expected increases in internationalization. Moreover, many of 
the reforms analyzed, such as privatization, institutional reform, and pension reform, 
constitute major policy initiatives and therefore it is unlikely that they were driven by 
(expected) changes in stock market activity. On the other hand, endogeneity could affect 
our results on the impact of capital market-specific reforms on domestic market 
development, as countries have incentives to invest in new trading platforms or enforce 
insider trading regulations when they expect increased local stock market activity. In sum, 
we think that even though endogeneity could be present, it would affect only a small part 
of our results and would not alter our main conclusions.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyze the impact of capital market-specific and related reforms 
on stock market development and internationalization. Our empirical analysis shows that 
these reforms are followed by increases in capitalization, trading, and capital raising in the 
local market. The evidence thus suggests that reforms are positively related to domestic 
stock market development, contrary to the claim that they are not effective and that the 
variation in panel data studies comes only from cross-country differences. However, we 
also find that internationalization increases after reforms, relative to both GDP and 
domestic market activity. This runs contrary to the view that a poor domestic environment 
prompts firms to access international markets and that reforms reduce incentives to 
migrate abroad. Rather, it supports the hypothesis that reforms make local firms more 
attractive, allowing them to access international markets. 
Our results come with some caveats. Reforms may be timed to coincide with high 
points in the domestic and/or international business cycles and with the implementation of 
other reforms. To address these issues, we control for domestic macroeconomic variables, 
U.S. interest rates, and output growth in OECD countries. We find our results to be robust 
to the inclusion of these variables. However, these controls may not capture the full 
impact of other reforms and/or the business cycle. Also, some prior macroeconomic and 
institutional reforms may be necessary for capital market reforms to be successful. 
Furthermore, our reform dummies could be capturing the impact of some underlying trend 
driving the processes of stock market development and internationalization, not captured 
by the controls included in the regressions. We try to address this issue by controlling for 
time effects in the regressions of domestic stock market development and find that some 
of the reform dummies remain statistically significant and positive, suggesting that capital 
market reforms are associated with increases in domestic stock market activity beyond any 
underlying trend. But accurately separating the impact of a common time trend from that  
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of reforms would require longer time series of our dependent variables. Thus, more future 
research in this direction would be welcome.  
Our conclusions should thus remain tentative. But they do suggest that reforms do 
not result in a lower level of activity abroad and a concentration of stock market activity in 
the domestic market, as some arguments predict. Our findings also suggest that financial 
globalization could pose a significant challenge to policymakers, as their efforts to foster 
domestic stock market development seem to translate into more activity abroad. The 
migration of trading to international markets may adversely affect the liquidity of those 
firms that remain in the local market and their ability to raise new equity capital. This 
could have a significant impact on medium sized firms, which are not able to directly 
access international markets. The unexpected impact of reforms on internationalization 
calls for a revision of the reform agenda and related expectations. Further research is 
necessary to understand whether the impact of reforms differs across countries and regions 
and if differences in the timing of specific reforms affect their impact on stock market 
development and internationalization.
45 
                                                 
45 Some of the cross-regional differences are already studied in de la Torre and Schmukler (2006) and de la 
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[10.050]
Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.184 ***
[5.465]




Institutional reform 0.093 ***
[6.773]
Pension reform 0.153 ***
[4.315]
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 438 315 582 392 302 211
No. of countries 45 32 62 40 32 24
R-squared within 0.207 0.096 0.052 0.143 0.146 0.094
R-squared overall 0.046 0.022 0.017 0.040 0.018 0.010
Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.193 0.428 0.335 0.221 0.184 0.353
Stock market liberalization 0.024
[0.830]
Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.270 ***
[5.447]




Institutional reform 0.066 ***
[3.853]
Pension reform 0.072 ***
[2.618]
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 432 329 559 396 282 195
No. of countries 44 34 59 41 30 22
R-squared within 0.002 0.092 0.071 0.083 0.056 0.038
R-squared overall 0.001 0.045 0.044 0.045 0.017 0.004
Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.108 0.196 0.073 0.051 0.065 0.171
Stock market liberalization 0.006 ***
[2.687]
Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.010 ***
[3.403]








Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 127 215 218 160 77 93
No. of countries 14 23 23 17 8 10
R-squared within 0.061 0.051 0.080 0.032 0.042 0.024
R-squared overall 0.036 0.036 0.045 0.020 0.019 0.010
Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.020
Capital Raised Domestically / GDP
Table 1
Reforms and Domestic Stock Market Development
This table shows least square regressions with robust standard errors estimated using fixed effects models for countries implementing reforms
between 1975 and 2004. The regressions consider a ten-year event window around the reform dates (five years before and five years after,
including the reform year). The sample includes only countries with at least two observations before the reform date and two afterwards.
Absolute values of t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively. See Appendix Table
2 for the definition of the variables.
Market Capitalization / GDP
Value Traded Domestically / GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4)
 26Stock market liberalization 0.045 ***
[5.059]
Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.202 ***
[7.747]




Institutional reform 0.038 ***
[4.955]
Pension reform 0.062 ***
[5.489]
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 242 236 475 312 279 96
No. of countries 31 26 56 40 32 11
R-squared within 0.110 0.229 0.076 0.087 0.096 0.256
R-squared overall 0.031 0.095 0.033 0.009 0.028 0.084
Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.022 0.097 0.032 0.035 0.023 0.049
Stock market liberalization 0.007 ***
[3.933]
Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.014 ***
[4.748]




Institutional reform 0.007 ***
[3.804]
Pension reform 0.006 *
[1.797]
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 299 244 530 345 293 106
No. of countries 36 26 61 43 33 12
R-squared within 0.052 0.095 0.015 0.037 0.046 0.031
R-squared overall 0.029 0.039 0.006 0.007 0.024 0.007
Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.001 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.012
Stock market liberalization 0.002 ***
[4.909]
Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.002 ***
[4.539]








Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 491 307 686 647 409 123
No. of countries 51 32 75 68 45 14
R-squared within 0.052 0.071 0.026 0.061 0.039 0.003
R-squared overall 0.044 0.056 0.018 0.042 0.024 0.001
Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002
Capital Raised Abroad / GDP
Table 2
Reforms and Stock Market Internationalization
This table shows least square regressions with robust standard errors estimated using fixed effects models for countries implementing reforms
between 1983 and 2000. The regressions consider a ten-year event window around the reform dates (five years before and five years after,
including the reform year). The sample includes only countries with at least two observations before the reform date and two afterwards.
Absolute values of t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively. See Appendix Table
2 for the definition of the variables.
Market Capitalization of International Firms / GDP
Value Traded Abroad / GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4)
 27Stock market liberalization 0.090 ***
[5.704]
Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.176 ***
[12.196]




Institutional reform 0.133 ***
[5.584]
Pension reform 0.187 ***
[6.498]
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 166 226 304 131 123 87
No. of countries 22 25 38 17 16 11
R-squared within 0.166 0.413 0.303 0.305 0.221 0.336
R-squared overall 0.112 0.121 0.087 0.027 0.096 0.052
Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.020 0.205 0.118 0.126 0.127 0.219
Stock market liberalization 0.059 ***
[2.887]
Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.132 ***
[3.090]




Institutional reform 0.135 ***
[2.734]
Pension reform 0.275 ***
[2.671]
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 206 231 338 155 119 88
No. of countries 25 25 41 20 15 11
R-squared within 0.045 0.045 0.009 0.000 0.041 0.089
R-squared overall 0.025 0.023 0.000 0.002 0.055 0.038
Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.011 0.076 0.138 0.044 0.038 0.125
Stock market liberalization 0.235 ***
[3.847]
Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.038
[0.727]








Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 117 212 205 148 51 60
No. of countries 13 23 22 16 6 7
R-squared within 0.127 0.003 0.005 0.054 0.220 0.006
R-squared overall 0.096 0.002 0.003 0.045 0.212 0.001
Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.050 0.217 0.222 0.058 0.054 0.388
Capital Raised Abroad / Capital Raised Domestically
Table 3
Reforms and Stock Market Internationalization Relative to Domestic Activity
This table shows least square regressions with robust standard errors estimated using fixed effects models for countries implementing reforms
between 1983 and 2000. The regressions consider a ten-year event window around the reform dates (five years before and five years after,
including the reform year). The sample includes only countries with at least two observations before the reform date and two afterwards.
Absolute values of t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively. See Appendix Table
2 for the definition of the variables.
Market Capitalization of International Firms / Total Market Capitalization
Value Traded Abroad / Value Traded Domestically
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2Stock market liberalization -0.008
[0.330]
Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.171 ***
[5.343]






Pension reform 0.143 ***
[3.577]
Time trend 0.037 *** 0.029 *** 0.034 *** 0.028 *** 0.034 *** 0.033 ***
[16.418] [12.470] [15.737] [15.850] [16.748] [17.229]
Time trend * developing country dummy -0.017 *** -0.013 *** -0.015 *** -0.010 *** -0.016 *** -0.015 ***
[8.107] [5.348] [6.630] [5.687] [6.792] [6.702]
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1,731 1,834 1,887 1,527 1,926 1,916
No. of countries 83 95 95 81 100 99
Stock market liberalization -0.020
[0.558]
Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.201 ***
[5.181]








Time trend 0.037 *** 0.028 *** 0.032 *** 0.026 *** 0.034 *** 0.034 ***
[18.094] [12.667] [14.364] [13.313] [18.676] [18.070]
Time trend * developing country dummy -0.026 *** -0.022 *** -0.024 *** -0.019 *** -0.026 *** -0.024 ***
[9.953] [10.117] [11.517] [10.100] [11.529] [11.794]
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1,681 1,814 1,830 1,496 1,862 1,864
No. of countries 79 92 90 78 94 94
Stock market liberalization 0.002
[0.588]
Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.005
[1.601]








Time trend 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 ** 0.001 *** 0.001 ***
[5.001] [5.796] [4.513] [2.073] [6.472] [6.739]
Time trend * developing country dummy -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 * -0.001 *** -0.001 ***
[3.225] [3.618] [2.909] [1.845] [3.654] [3.565]
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 725 754 725 516 764 771
No. of countries 41 42 40 31 42 43
(5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4)
(5) (6)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Raised Domestically / GDP
Table 8
Reforms and Domestic Stock Market Development - Controlling for Time Trend
This table shows least square regressions with robust standard errors estimated using fixed effects models for the period 1975-2004. The
sample includes only countries with at least six annual observations. Absolute values of t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** mean
significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively. See Appendix Table 2 for the definition of the variables.
Market Capitalization / GDP
Value Traded Domestically / GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)










Albania . . No reform No reform 1993 No reform
Argentina 1989 1995 No reform 1990 1991 1994
Armenia . No reform 1996 1996 No reform No reform
Australia Before sample 1996 1987 1991 No reform 1993
Austria Before sample No reform 1996 1988 No reform No reform
Azerbaijan . . 1997 1997 No reform No reform
Bahrain . No reform 1999 No reform No reform No reform
Bangladesh 1991 1998 1998 No reform 1987 No reform
Barbados No reform No reform 2000 No reform No reform No reform
Belgium Before sample 1994 1996 1990 No reform No reform
Benin No reform . . 1988 1992 No reform
Bolivia . No reform No reform 1992 1985 1997
Botswana 1990 No reform No reform . 1998 No reform
Brazil 1991 1978 No reform 1991 1999 No reform
Bulgaria 1992 No reform 1997 1991 1997 2002
C a m b o d i a .... 1999 No reform
Cameroon No reform . . 1998 No reform No reform
Canada Before sample 1976  * 1977 . No reform No reform
Chile 1992 1996 No reform 1985 1976  * 1981
China . No reform 1990 1992 1978  * No reform
Colombia 1991 No reform 1996 1991 No reform 1994
Costa Rica No reform No reform 1991 No reform 1990 2000
Cote d'Ivoire 1995 . 1999 1991 No reform No reform
Croatia . No reform 1999 1992 2000 2002
Cyprus . No reform 1999 . No reform No reform
Czech Republic 1993 1993 1998 1991  * 1991  * No reform
Denmark Before sample 1996 1988 No reform No reform 1993
Djibouti . . . No reform 1996 No reform
Dominican Republic No reform . . No reform 1996  * 2003  *
Ecuador 1994 No reform No reform No reform 2000 No reform
Egypt 1992 No reform No reform 1993 No reform No reform
El Salvador No reform No reform 1994 No reform 1994 1998
Estonia 1996 No reform 1996 1993 1995 2002
Fiji No reform . No reform No reform No reform No reform
Finland 1990 1993 1988 1988 No reform No reform
France Before sample 1975  * 1986 1986 No reform No reform
Georgia . . 2000  * No reform 1995 No reform
Germany Before sample 1995 No reform 1988 No reform No reform
Ghana 1993 No reform No reform 1989 1985 No reform
Greece 1987 1996 1992 1997 No reform No reform
Guatemala No reform No reform No reform No reform 1994 No reform
Guinea-Bissau . . . No reform 1994 No reform
Guyana No reform . . No reform 1991 No reform
Honduras No reform No reform 1993 1988 2003  * No reform
Hong Kong Before sample 1994 1986 . No reform 2000
Hungary 2000 1995 1998 1989 1995 1998
Iceland 1991 No reform 1989 . No reform No reform
India 1992 1998 1995 1991 No reform No reform
Indonesia 1989 1996 1995 1991 1985 No reform
Iran No reform No reform 1994 No reform 1999 No reform
Ireland 1992 No reform 2000 2001 No reform No reform
Israel 1993 1989 1997 . No reform No reform
Italy Before sample 1996 1994 1985 No reform No reform
Jamaica 1991 No reform 2000 1989 1993 No reform
Japan 1983 1990 1982 . No reform No reform
Jordan 1995 No reform 2000 2000 1998 No reform
Kazakhstan . No reform 1997 1994 No reform 1998
Kenya 1995 No reform No reform 1992 No reform No reform
Korea 1992 1988 1988 . 1998 No reform
Kuwait No reform No reform 1995 . 1986 No reform
Kyrgyz Republic . . 1999 No reform No reform No reform
Lao PDR . . . 1991 No reform No reform
Appendix Table 1
Country Coverage and Reform Dates
This table shows the list of countries included in the regressions and the dates of the different reforms analyzed by country. Countries
with missing values are those with no data to determine whether they implemented the reform or not. "Before sample" means that the
country implemented the reform before the start of our sample period (1975). * means that the reform was not included in any of the
regressions due to lack of adequate data on the dependent variables for the required period (at least two annual observations before
and after the reform date). The list of countries includes countries that did not implement any reform that are included in the
regressions in Table 8. See Appendix Table 2 for a definition of the variables and the data sources.










Latvia 1993 No reform 1997 1995 1999 2001
Lebanon . No reform No reform No reform No reform No reform
Lithuania 1993 No reform 1993 1992 2000 2001
Luxembourg . No reform 1991 . No reform No reform
Macedonia . No reform 2001 1994 1994 2003  *
Malaysia 1988 1996 1992 1989 No reform No reform
Malta 1992 No reform 1996 No reform 2004  * No reform
Mauritius 1994 No reform 2001 No reform 1985 No reform
Mexico 1989 No reform 1996 1985 1991 1997
Moldova . No reform 1998 No reform No reform No reform
Mongolia . No reform 1999 . No reform No reform
Morocco 1988 No reform 1997 1993 No reform No reform
Mozambique . . 1999 1989 No reform No reform
Namibia . No reform 1998 . 1995 No reform
Nepal No reform . No reform No reform No reform No reform
Netherlands Before sample 1994 1994 1993 No reform 1985
New Zealand 1987 No reform 1991 1987 No reform No reform
Nicaragua No reform . . 1991 1994 2000  *
Nigeria 1995 No reform 1999 1989 2003 No reform
Norway 1989 1990 1988 . No reform No reform
Oman 1999 1999 1998 No reform No reform No reform
Pakistan 1991 No reform 1997 1991 No reform No reform
Panama . No reform 1999 1992 2000 No reform
Papua New Guinea . . 1999 No reform No reform No reform
Paraguay No reform No reform No reform No reform 2004  * No reform
Peru 1992 1994 No reform 1991 1993 1993
Philippines 1991 No reform 1993 1991 1994 No reform
Poland 1991 1993 1996 1990 1990 1999
Portugal 1986 No reform 1991 1989 No reform No reform
Romania No reform No reform 1995 1992 2000 No reform
Russia . No reform 1994 1991 2000 2004  *
Saudi Arabia 1999 No reform 1990 No reform No reform No reform
Senegal No reform . . 1997 1994 No reform
Serbia and Montenegro . . . No reform No reform No reform
Singapore Before sample 1978 1989 . No reform No reform
Slovak Republic No reform No reform 1994 1992 2000 2003
Slovenia 2001 1998 1993 1992 2000 No reform
South Africa 1996 No reform 1996 1997 1996 No reform
Spain 1985 1998 1989 1988 No reform No reform
Sri Lanka 1991 1996 1997 1990 1990 No reform
Swaziland No reform No reform No reform . No reform No reform
Sweden 1980 1990 1989 1992 No reform 2001
Switzerland Before sample 1995 1996 . No reform 1985
Syrian Arab Republic No reform . . . 1987  * No reform
Taiwan 1991 1989 1985 . 1980 No reform
Tanzania . No reform No reform 1992 1997 No reform
Thailand 1987 1993 1991 1993 No reform No reform
Togo No reform . . 1990 1985 No reform
Trinidad and Tobago 1997 No reform No reform No reform 1993 No reform
Tunisia 1995 No reform 1996 1988 No reform No reform
Turkey 1989 1996 1993 1988 2001 No reform
Uganda . . No reform 1992 1996 No reform
Ukraine . No reform 1996 1992 2000 No reform
United Arab Emirates . . 2000 No reform 1988 No reform
United Kingdom Before sample 1981 No reform 1981 No reform 1988
United States Before sample Before sample No reform . No reform No reform
Uruguay No reform No reform 1994 No reform No reform 1995
Uzbekistan . No reform 1996 No reform No reform No reform
Venezuela 1990 No reform 1992 1991 No reform No reform
W e s t  B a n k  a n d  G a z a .... N o  r e f o r m N o  r e f o r m
Zambia No reform No reform No reform 1993 1997 No reform
Zimbabwe 1993 No reform No reform 1994 No reform No reform
Appendix Table 1 (Cont.)
Country Coverage and Reform Dates
This table shows the list of countries included in the regressions and the dates of the different reforms analyzed by country. Countries
with missing values are those with no data to determine whether they implemented the reform or not. "Before sample" means that the
country implemented the reform before the start of our sample period (1975). * means that the reform was not included in any of the
regressions due to lack of adequate data on the dependent variables for the required period (at least two annual observations before
and after the reform date). The list of countries includes countries that did not implement any reform that are included in the
regressions in Table 8. See Appendix Table 2 for a definition of the variables and the data sources.
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a
t
a
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
s
T
h
i
s
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
s
h
o
w
s
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
u
s
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
.
 
A
l
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
.
 
E
x
c
e
p
t
 
w
h
e
n
 
n
o
t
e
d
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
c
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
1
9
7
5
-
2
0
0
4
.
 
3
6S
e
r
i
e
s
 
N
a
m
e
s
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
S
o
u
r
c
e
S
t
o
c
k
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
D
u
m
m
y
t
h
a
t
e
q
u
a
l
s
o
n
e
o
n
a
n
d
a
f
t
e
r
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
o
f
s
t
o
c
k
m
a
r
k
e
t
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
.
T
h
e
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
d
a
t
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
s
t
o
t
h
e
d
a
t
e
o
f
f
o
r
m
a
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
c
h
a
n
g
e
a
f
t
e
r
w
h
i
c
h
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
i
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
s
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
l
y
h
a
v
e
t
h
e
p
o
s
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
t
o
i
n
v
e
s
t
i
n
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
e
q
u
i
t
y
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
i
e
s
.
F
o
r
t
h
e
d
a
t
a
f
r
o
m
K
a
m
i
n
s
k
y
a
n
d
S
c
h
m
u
k
l
e
r
(
2
0
0
3
)
a
n
d
V
i
n
h
a
s
d
e
S
o
u
z
a
(
2
0
0
5
)
,
w
e
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
t
h
e
f
i
r
s
t
y
e
a
r
w
h
e
n
a
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
’
s
s
t
o
c
k
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
i
s
 
f
u
l
l
y
 
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
e
d
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
d
a
t
e
.
 
B
e
k
a
e
r
t
,
 
H
a
r
v
e
y
,
 
a
n
d
 
L
u
n
d
b
a
l
d
 
(
2
0
0
5
)
,
 
K
a
m
i
n
s
k
y
 
a
n
d
 
S
c
h
m
u
k
l
e
r
 
(
2
0
0
3
)
,
 
a
n
d
 
V
i
n
h
a
s
 
d
e
 
S
o
u
z
a
 
(
2
0
0
5
)
E
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
l
a
w
s
D
u
m
m
y
t
h
a
t
e
q
u
a
l
s
o
n
e
i
f
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
l
a
w
s
a
r
e
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
e
d
a
n
d
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
.
T
h
e
d
a
t
e
o
f
t
h
e
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
i
n
s
i
d
e
r
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
l
a
w
s
i
s
t
h
e
d
a
t
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
i
r
s
t
p
r
o
s
e
c
u
t
i
o
n
.
T
h
e
d
a
t
a
c
o
m
e
f
r
o
m
 
a
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
n
a
i
r
e
 
s
e
n
t
 
t
o
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
s
 
o
f
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
i
n
 
M
a
r
c
h
 
1
9
9
9
.
B
h
a
t
t
a
c
h
a
r
y
a
 
a
n
d
 
D
a
o
u
k
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
I
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
e
l
e
c
t
r
o
n
i
c
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
s
D
u
m
m
y
t
h
a
t
e
q
u
a
l
s
o
n
e
i
f
t
h
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
t
h
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
h
a
s
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
a
f
u
l
l
y
a
u
t
o
m
a
t
e
d
e
l
e
c
t
r
o
n
i
c
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
s
y
s
t
e
m
.
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
w
h
e
r
e
e
l
e
c
t
r
o
n
i
c
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
c
o
e
x
i
s
t
s
w
i
t
h
f
l
o
o
r
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
a
r
e
n
o
t
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
.
J
a
i
n
 
(
2
0
0
5
)
P
r
i
v
a
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
D
u
m
m
y
t
h
a
t
e
q
u
a
l
s
o
n
e
i
f
t
h
e
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
h
a
s
s
t
a
r
t
e
d
a
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
o
f
p
r
i
v
a
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
s
t
a
t
e
-
o
w
n
e
d
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
.
W
e
d
e
f
i
n
e
t
h
e
s
t
a
r
t
i
n
g
d
a
t
e
o
f
a
p
r
i
v
a
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
a
s
t
h
e
f
i
r
s
t
y
e
a
r
w
i
t
h
a
t
l
e
a
s
t
t
w
o
p
r
i
v
a
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
t
h
a
t
i
s
f
o
l
l
o
w
e
d
b
y
f
u
r
t
h
e
r
p
r
i
v
a
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
a
t
l
e
a
s
t
t
h
r
e
e
o
f
t
h
e
n
e
x
t
f
o
u
r
y
e
a
r
s
.
F
o
r
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
t
h
a
t
h
a
v
e
p
r
i
v
a
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
1
9
8
8
o
r
1
9
8
9
i
n
t
h
e
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
,
 
w
e
 
u
s
e
 
t
h
e
 
d
a
t
e
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
P
e
r
o
t
t
i
 
a
n
d
 
v
a
n
 
O
i
j
e
n
 
(
2
0
0
1
)
.
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
D
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
,
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
B
a
r
o
m
e
t
e
r
 
D
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
,
 
P
e
r
o
t
t
i
 
a
n
d
 
v
a
n
 
O
i
j
e
n
 
(
2
0
0
1
)
,
 
a
n
d
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
.
P
e
n
s
i
o
n
 
r
e
f
o
r
m
D
u
m
m
y
t
h
a
t
e
q
u
a
l
s
o
n
e
a
f
t
e
r
t
h
e
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
a
l
p
e
n
s
i
o
n
r
e
f
o
r
m
,
m
o
v
i
n
g
a
w
a
y
f
r
o
m
a
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
p
a
y
-
a
s
-
y
o
u
-
g
o
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
t
o
 
a
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
l
y
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
d
 
f
u
n
d
e
d
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
o
r
 
a
 
m
u
l
t
i
p
i
l
l
a
r
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
.
P
a
l
a
c
i
o
s
 
a
n
d
 
P
a
l
l
a
r
e
s
-
M
i
l
l
a
r
e
s
 
(
2
0
0
0
)
,
 
t
h
e
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
A
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
P
e
n
s
i
o
n
 
F
u
n
d
s
 
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
 
A
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
 
(
A
I
O
S
)
,
 
t
h
e
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
F
e
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
P
e
n
s
i
o
n
 
F
u
n
d
s
 
A
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
o
r
s
 
(
F
I
A
P
)
,
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
C
e
n
t
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
P
e
n
s
i
o
n
 
R
e
f
o
r
m
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
r
e
f
o
r
m
D
u
m
m
y
t
h
a
t
e
q
u
a
l
s
o
n
e
a
f
t
e
r
t
h
e
s
t
a
r
t
o
f
a
t
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
i
n
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
t
o
I
M
F
(
2
0
0
5
)
.
D
a
t
e
s
o
f
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
t
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
a
r
e
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
t
h
e
e
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
C
a
t
o
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
i
n
d
e
x
o
f
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
f
r
e
e
d
o
m
,
w
h
i
c
h
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
a
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
’
s
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
f
r
e
e
d
o
m
b
y
a
n
a
l
y
z
i
n
g
f
i
v
e
m
a
j
o
r
a
r
e
a
s
:
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
s
i
z
e
;
l
e
g
a
l
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
a
n
d
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
o
f
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
r
i
g
h
t
s
;
a
c
c
e
s
s
t
o
s
o
u
n
d
m
o
n
e
y
;
f
r
e
e
d
o
m
t
o
t
r
a
d
e
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
l
y
;
a
n
d
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
c
r
e
d
i
t
,
l
a
b
o
r
,
a
n
d
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
.
T
h
i
s
i
n
d
e
x
r
a
n
g
e
s
f
r
o
m
o
n
e
(
r
e
p
r
e
s
s
e
d
)
t
o
t
e
n
(
f
r
e
e
)
.
I
M
F
(
2
0
0
5
)
d
e
f
i
n
e
s
t
h
e
s
t
a
r
t
o
f
a
n
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
t
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
i
n
a
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
a
s
t
h
e
f
i
r
s
t
y
e
a
r
i
n
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
f
o
r
w
a
r
d
l
o
o
k
i
n
g
e
i
g
h
t
-
y
e
a
r
m
o
v
i
n
g
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
o
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
e
x
o
f
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
f
r
e
e
d
o
m
e
x
c
e
e
d
s
b
y
a
t
l
e
a
s
t
o
n
e
p
o
i
n
t
i
t
s
b
a
c
k
w
a
r
d
l
o
o
k
i
n
g
e
i
g
h
t
-
y
e
a
r
m
o
v
i
n
g
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
a
n
d
r
e
a
c
h
e
s
a
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
l
e
v
e
l
o
f
f
o
u
r
p
o
i
n
t
s
.
T
h
e
l
i
s
t
o
f
t
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
w
a
s
r
e
v
i
e
w
e
d
b
y
I
M
F
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
d
e
s
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
a
d
j
u
s
t
e
d
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
a
p
p
r
o
p
r
i
a
t
e
.
I
M
F
 
(
2
0
0
5
)
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
i
n
g
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
d
u
m
m
y
D
u
m
m
y
t
h
a
t
e
q
u
a
l
s
o
n
e
i
f
a
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
i
s
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
e
d
a
s
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
i
n
g
a
n
d
z
e
r
o
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
.
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
a
r
e
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
e
d
o
n
t
h
e
b
a
s
i
s
o
f
t
h
e
i
r
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
i
n
c
o
m
e
l
e
v
e
l
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
1
9
8
7
a
n
d
2
0
0
4
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
t
o
t
h
e
W
o
r
l
d
B
a
n
k
W
o
r
l
d
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
.
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
i
n
g
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
l
o
w
e
r
-
a
n
d
m
i
d
d
l
e
-
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
:
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
x
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
2
 
(
C
o
n
t
.
)
S
e
r
i
e
s
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
D
a
t
a
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
s
T
h
i
s
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
s
h
o
w
s
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
u
s
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
.
 
A
l
l
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
.
 
E
x
c
e
p
t
 
w
h
e
n
 
n
o
t
e
d
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
c
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
1
9
7
5
-
2
0
0
4
.
 
3
7